The Philosophy of Mind and the Hard Problem of Consciousness in Contemporary Thought

Abstract

The philosophy of mind's engagement with consciousness represents one of the most challenging and persistent problems in contemporary thought. This study examines the hard problem of consciousness as formulated by Chalmers (1995) and its impact on current philosophical discourse and neuroscientific research. The investigation employs a comprehensive literature review and quantitative analysis of philosophical attitudes toward consciousness using survey data from 2009-2020. Our hypothesis centers on the idea that the hard problem maintains significant philosophical relevance despite empirical advances in neuroscience. Results from the 2020 PhilPapers survey (n=1,785 philosophers) reveal that 62.42% of philosophers consider the hard problem genuine, while 29.72% deny its existence. Analysis of consciousness research methodologies shows a persistent explanatory gap between neural correlates and subjective experience. The study demonstrates that contemporary consciousness research faces fundamental methodological challenges in bridging first-person phenomenological data with third-person empirical findings. Discussion reveals that while neuroscientific progress in identifying neural correlates of consciousness has been substantial, the hard problem persists as a conceptual challenge requiring integration of philosophical and empirical approaches. We conclude that the hard problem of consciousness remains a central issue requiring interdisciplinary collaboration between philosophy, neuroscience, and cognitive science to advance our understanding of the mind-brain relationship and the nature of subjective experience.